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ABSTRACT 
Generally accepted principles of effective corporate governance have taken hold in the context of 
different models of governance, whose implementation is also linked to the share structure of the 
companies and to the dynamics of risk’s capital markets. Global companies need a global 
approach in the acquisition of consensus and financial resources, first of all through a correct 
development of the corporate governance activities and promoting a market-driven management 
inspired by long-term sustainable development. In this context, the growing importance of 
sustainability and the concept of global responsibility in the relationships with stakeholders join 
together with the convergence of corporate governance rules, reducing the gap between insider 
and outsider systems. This paper, by means of a research on the first ten most capitalised 
companies listed in countries characterized by different capital market orientation and corporate 
governance models (Usa, UK, Germany, France and Italy), aims to underlines the relations 
between these two to deepen the requisites for a more effective and sustainable governance. 
Keywords: Corporate governance, Sustainability, Capital markets, Insider systems, Outsider 
systems, Stakeholders. 
JEL Classification: O16. 
 
Contribution/ Originality: This study contributes in the existing literature to 
emphasize the importance of corporate governance approaches inspired on 
sustainability in the capital markets. A governance oriented to sustainability 
implies significant changes in the relationships with company’s stakeholders, 
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shareholders in particular, promoting a trend of convergence between insider and 
outsiders systems.   
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the last decade the globalisation of markets and information has emphasised the attention for 
effectiveness of corporate governance models and convergence of corporate governance principles 
(Cohen et al., 2000; Clarke and Dela Rama, 2007; Salvioni, 2008; Dignam and Galanis, 2009). At 
the same time, globalisation accentuates failures in corporate governance systems, showed by the 
clamorous corporate scandals (Oecd, 2002; Wade, 2002; Marnet, 2007; Da Silveira, 2011).  
The crises that had stroked the global economy highlighted the definitive fall of space barriers 
and the emerging of new drivers, threats and opportunities for the corporate success. It has affirmed 
a new approach to the companies' role in the society, based on a wide vision of responsibility, on a 
modern interpretation of the links between the long-lasting company’s success and the equal 
composition of all stakeholders' interests. In global markets the need for improving the approach to 
company governance has emerged according to a logic system directed to: the appropriate 
emphasis on the competitive orientation in all markets (market-driven management) (Brondoni, 
2003; Brondoni, 2008)  the enhancement of the close relationships among managing variables in 
the economic, competitive and social-environmental field (Esti and Winston, 2008); the 
development of strategies of risk prevention and control (Salvioni, 2012). Furthermore, a market-
driven approach is ingrained in corporate governance, in view of the fact that in the case of 
separation between shareholders and managers the mandate to govern is granted by the 
shareholders to management and must be correctly exercised in favour of company's relevant 
stakeholders (Sappington, 1991; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Salvioni 
and Astori, 2013; Salvioni and Gennari, 2014; Salvioni et al., 2014). For listed companies, 
especially, the influence of capital shares underwriters on corporate value (as primary sources of 
resources and by means of shares buying and selling) emphasising the importance of a market-
driven approach to the stock markets (Salvioni and Bosetti, 2006).  Generally accepted principles 
of effective corporate governance have taken hold in the context of different models of governance, 
whose implementation is also linked to the share structure of the companies and to the dynamics of 
risk in capital markets. The increasing importance of sustainability and integration of 
responsibilities tends to reduce the gap between insider and outsider systems.   
Based on this introduction, the paper aims to go in-depth of relations among market-driven 
approach to the capital markets, the degree of ownership and control and the increasing importance 
of corporate sustainability.   
The research examines the relationships among outsider or insider systems, shareholders 
categories appointing the corporate governance organs, stakeholders represented in corporate 
governance bodies. After a short analysis on corporate governance models, the empirical analysis 
considers the first ten listed companies for capitalisation in Usa and UK (outsider systems with 
one-tier corporate governance model), in Germany (insider system with vertical two-tier corporate 
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governance model called 'Rhenish'), in France (insider system characterized by the choice among 
one-tier and vertical two-tier corporate governance models), in Italy (insider system characterized 
by the choice among one-tier, vertical two-tier and horizontal two-tier corporate governance 
models). Finally, the paper remarks the promotion of convergence on insider and outsider systems 
related to the achievement of corporate sustainability. 
 
2. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND 
CAPITAL MARKETS ORIENTATION 
Market capitalization is a measurement of business value based on share price and number of 
shares outstanding. It generally represents the market's view of a company's stock value (Freeman, 
1984; Clarkson, 1995; Hutton, 1995; Carroll, 2004; Letza et al., 2004; Ullah et al., 2014). The link 
between stocks value and management choices suggests a reflection on the corporate governance 
role and the effectiveness of rules for its correct implementation in favour of stakeholders. The risk 
of strategic choices not oriented to sustainable development for the advantage of all stakeholders, 
as excessively focused on the short-term profitability and on specific stakeholders' interests, exists. 
This risk is greater when company's managers are distinct from its ultimate owners (Berle and 
Means, 1932, Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
Corporate governance models characterizing different countries, governed by mandatory or 
voluntary rules, and the degree of listed companies' market-driven approach disclose some 
connection with features of capital markets and with the degree of stock dispersion or concentration 
and connected control mechanisms. The capital dispersion in the financial market incites the 
company towards sustainable corporate decisions which satisfy a large public of actual or potential 
stakeholders and towards the spread of information which reflect the long-term value the company 
is creating. The market perception of sustainability corporate strategies should limit opportunistic 
pressures on company to deliver earnings in the very short-term.  
Not sustainable strategies could maximize profitability in the short-term, but imply the risk of 
some stakeholders’ displeasure and future happen of not budgeted costs (for example, the 
retirement of a product by market). These costs could be evident, but also difficult to determine 
when connected with the key factors for the company's success (imagine, market leadership, 
product’s quality, etc.). So, companies should educate stakeholders about the long-run value 
implications of their sustainable decisions and their market capitalization should express this value-
creation perception. 
In relation to the different degree of capital dispersion, we can identify outsider systems 
(market-oriented systems) typical of countries with a dominance of large listed companies with 
very fragmented, widespread ownership, and insider systems typical of countries with less 
developed financial markets and concentrated and stable stockholder structure. 
In the outsider system a direct participation in company's governance (by means of the 
appointment of managers) could be discouraged (free rider syndrome) (Cornes and Sandler, 1986). 
Thus the control is essentially committed to capital market which, in the presence of truthful, 
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correct and transparent communications, is able to reflect company’s performance in the stock 
value. This situation includes: a major role for reputational intermediaries (such as external 
auditors, stock exchanges, credit rating agencies and stock market analysts) in providing externally 
visible performance information; the use of the stock price as a key indicator of the firm’s 
prospects; an active market for corporate control and incentive-based pay (Barker, 2006). 
In the following tables we show the market capitalization and the degree of capital dispersion 
in financial market for the most significant outsider systems (USA and UK) and insider ones 
(Germany, France and Italy). For each country we consider the first ten listed companies in terms 
of market capitalisation because we think that companies are more visible in the public domain and 
more likely to be scrutinized by various stakeholders.  
Table 1 shows the capital structure of the first ten listed companies in the USA, underlining the 
percentage of capital held by different categories of shareholders. As we can see, the corporate 
capital is very sprinkled: no company has retail shareholders with a stock share exceeding 5%, 
except for these with a preponderance of company's founders (William Gates in Microsoft, Warren 
Buffet in Berkshire Hathaway and Walton family in Wal-Mart). Institutional investors and mutual 
funds have a significant percentage of equity.  
 
Table-1. USA – January 2014, Market capitalization and corporate stockholder structure 
(http://finance.yahoo.com, http://ycharts.com, companies’ websites) 
Company Market Cap 
(Billion $) 
 
 
Shares held by 5% 
retail shareholders (*) 
Equity of the first institutional 
investors and mutual funds 
 
 Jan ‘14 Jan ‘13 % %  % 
Apple 482.01 493.25 -2.28 0 Vanguard Group 
State Street Corporation 
FMR 
4.95 
4.28 
3.18 
Exxon Mobil 441.53 398.34 +10.84 0 Vanguard Gr. 
State Street Corporation 
BlackRock  
5.29 
4.30 
2.65 
Google 380.48 241.97 +57.24 0 FMR 
Vanguard Group 
State Street Corporation 
6.85 
4.88 
4.24 
Microsoft 302.20 222.33 +35.92 9 
 
Vanguard Group 
State Street Corporation 
Capital World Investors 
4.49 
4.13 
3.45 
Berkshire Hatw 282.29 229.87 +22.80 1 N.A. N.A. 
General Electric 276.10 217.48 +26.95 0 Vanguard Group 
State Street Corporation 
BlackRock  
4.93 
4.16 
2.63 
Johnson & 
Johnson 
259.07 196.55 +31.81 0 State Street Corporation 
Vanguard Group 
BlackRock  
5.64 
4.92 
2.69 
Wal Mart Stores 254.49 230.15 +10.58 51 
 
Vanguard Group 
State Street Corporation 
Berkshire Hathaway 
2.80 
2.33 
1.53 
Chevron Corp. 239.15 213.98 +11.76 0 Vanguard Group 
State Street Corporation 
BlackRock  
5.43 
5.41 
2.64 
Wells Fargo & 
Co. 
238.83 183.06 +30.47 0 Berkshire Hathaway 
Vanguard Group 
State Street Corporation 
8.81 
4.68 
4.09 
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(*) Rule 13d-3 under the Exchange Act requires owners of more than 5% of a class of voting equity to report their 
ownership on Schedule 13D or Schedule 13G. 
 
The important presence of large shareholders (blockholders) can influence corporate 
governance (Edmans, 2013) by means of: the so-called 'voice' (Hirschman, 1970; Grossman and 
Hart, 1980; Edmans and Manso, 2011); mechanisms of 'exit' (Admati and Pfleiderer, 2009; Khanna 
and Mathews, 2012; Dasgupta and Piacentino, 2013; Goldman and Strobl, 2013); extracting private 
benefits of control or pursuing objectives other than firm value maximization (Zwiebel, 1995; 
Burkart et al., 1997; Bolton and Von Thadden, 1998; Pagano and Röell, 1998). So, when an 
effective control lacks, the presence of large shareholders may alleviate conflicts of interest 
between managers and minority investors, but may create conflicts of interest between 
blockholders and small shareholders. 
 
Table-2. UK – January 2014, Market capitalization and corporate stockholder structure 
(http://finance.yahoo.com, http://ycharts.com, companies’ websites) 
Company Market Cap 
(Billion $) 
 
 
Shares held by 5% 
retail shareholders 
Equity of the first 
institutional investors and 
mutual funds 
 
 Jan ‘14 Jan ‘13 % %  % 
Royal Dutch Shl 235.66 226.07 +4.24 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Hsbc Holdings 202.83 197.14 +2.87 0 FMR 
Fisher Asset Management 
Dodge & Cox 
0.46 
0.33 
0.25 
BP 150.82 138.42 +8.96 0 Wellington Management C.   
Franklin Resources  
State Street Corporation    
1.60 
1.21 
1.04 
Glaxosmithkline 128.17 107.81 +18.89 0 Dodge & Cox 
Royal Bank of Canada 
Fisher Asset Management 
2.49 
0.74 
0.46 
Vodafone Group 126.82 85.63 +48.10 0 Paulson & Company 
FMR 
Invesco 
0.73 
0.65 
0.59 
Brit Am Tobacco 99.28 97.34 +1.99 0 FMR 
Fidelity Select Portfolios 
Variable Insurance Fund II 
1.83 
0.31 
0.27 
Rio Tinto  97.15 105.97 -8.32 0 Franklin Resources 
State  Automobile Insurance 
WHV Investment Mgmt 
1.17 
0.73 
0.43 
Lloyds Bnk Grp 94.56 56.52 + 67.30 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Diageo  82.18 73.60 +11.66 0 Barrow et al. 
Vanguard/Windsor II 
Wells Fargo & Company 
1.04 
0.84 
0.68 
AstraZeneca 74.00 60.03 +23.27 0 Wellington Management C. 
Vanguard/Wellington Fund  
Allianz Asset Management 
2.35 
0.95 
0.83 
 
Table 2 highlights that there are not UK retail shareholders with shares exceeding 5% 
threshold and the percentage possessed by institutional investors and mutual fund is more scattered 
than in the USA market. In fact, starting from the 1960s, the institutional investors have gradually 
replaced the individual investors (see the analysis of the UK Office of National Statistics). 
International Journal of Management and Sustainability, 2014, 3(8): 469-483 
 
 
 
6 
 
The relationship between ownership concentration and firm efficiency is a complicate issue 
(Okpara, 2011). The importance of shareholders’ rights is a crucial aspect for controlling the 
behaviour and actions of the board of directors, but also the board’s awareness of other 
stakeholders’ interests is an essential condition for the company’s success in the long term. So, a 
company’s market-driven orientation should be interpreted with reference to all markets of interests 
basing on stakeholder’s typology and on a concept of global responsibility.  
Insider systems are typical of countries with less developed financial markets and concentrated 
and stable stockholder structure in condition to influence corporate decisions. The existence of 
majority equities (by banks, families, state, employees, etc.) can favour managers’ long-term 
perspective but can create unbalanced governance systems if there aren’t rules in favour of 
minority shareholders or other relevant stakeholders. Blockholders rather than external 
shareholders are fulfilling the monitoring role facing company management. A lack of rights and 
safeguards can discourage minority shareholders’ involvement in the ownership structure (Barker, 
2006). 
Historic and economic events of insider systems had led partially different corporate 
governance models: 'Rhenish' insider systems characterised by the active involvement of 
employees (because of co-determination laws) and banks (that often hold long-term stakes in 
corporations) in corporate governance boards; 'Latin' insider systems where the mandate for 
corporate governance is attributed exclusively to the owners (with strong involvement of majority 
stockholders).  
  
Table-3. January 2014, Germany – Market capitalization and corporate stockholder structure 
(http://it.finance.yahoo.com, http://ycharts.com, http://www.boerse-frankfurt.de/, companies’ 
websites)  
 Market Cap 
(Billion $) 
 
 
Shares held by 3% retail 
shareholders (*) 
Equity of the first 
institutional investors and 
mutual funds 
 
Company Jan ‘14 Jan ‘13 %  %  % 
Siemens AG 114.88 91.84 +25.09 Siemens Family 
Treasury 
5.64 
4.32 
Vanguard/Welling. Fund 
Fisher Asset Mngmt 
Vanguard International 
0.58 
0.41 
0.19 
Bayer 114.09 77.82 +46.61 N.A.  Capital Research C. 
BlackRock 
6.48 
5.00 
Sap 100.47 98.15 +2.36 Hasso Plattner 
Klaus Tschira 
Dietmar Hopp 
9.79 
7.50 
5.31 
Harding Loevner 
Fisher Asset Mngmt 
Goldman Sachs Group 
0.55 
0.52 
0.30 
Basf 95.34 81.84 +16.50 N.A. N.A. BlackRock 6.96 
Daimler 90.61 59.44 +52.44 KuwaitAuthority 
Renault 
Nissan 
6.80 
1.54 
1.54 
N.A. N.A. 
Allianz 80.82 64.54 +25.22 - 0.00 BlackRock 5.00 
Volkswagen 80.41 67.30 +19.48 Porsche  
Niedersachsen 
Qatar Holding 
50.73 
20.00 
16.99 
N.A. N.A. 
Deutsche 
Telekom 
73.93 49.95 +48.00 KfW Bankengruppe 
Federal Republic 
17.40 
14.50 
BlackRock 5.02 
Bmw 68.30 57.65 +18.47 Stefan Quandt 17.40 N.A. N.A. 
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Johanna Quandt 
Susanne Klatten 
16.70 
12.60 
Deutsche 
Bank 
49.12 44.05 +11.51 - 0.00 BlackRock 5.14 
(*) Under the German Securities Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz), holders of voting securities of a listed German 
company must notify that company of the level of their holding whenever it reaches, exceeds or falls below specified 
thresholds. These lower threshold is 3 percent of the company’s outstanding voting securities. 
 
Both for 'Rhenish' insider systems and for 'Latin' ones, globalisation of buying and selling 
stocks and integration among stock exchanges have facilitated the entrance of big institutional 
investors, asset management societies and retail investors. Tables 3,4 and 5, concerning insiders 
systems, highlight an high concentration of capital: the founders or the State have a very significant 
role as shareholders. The different role that the market has acquired in outsider and insider systems 
is also reflected in market capitalisation of listed companies, with lower values in Germany, France 
and Italy than in USA and the UK.      
 
Table-4. January 2014, France – Market capitalization and corporate stockholder structure 
(http://it.finance.yahoo.com, http://ycharts.com, companies’ websites)  
Company Capitalisation 
(Billion $) 
 
 
Shares held by >5% 
retail shareholders (*) 
 Equity of the first 
institutional investors and 
mutual funds 
 
 Jan ‘14 Jan ‘13 % %   % 
Sanofi  138.64 127.95 +8.35 L’Oreal 
Treasury 
8.93 
0.27 
Dodge & Cox 
Barrow et al. 
Franklin Res. 
1.64 
0.85 
0.50 
Total 135.17 122.03 +10.77 Treasury 
Bruxelles Lambert 
Compagnie Nat. Port. 
4.60 
4.00 
1.40 
Franklin Res. 
BlackRock Advisors 
Allianz Asset Mngmt 
0.63 
0.53 
0.52 
L’ Oreal 104.99 84.41 +24.38 Bettercount Family 
Nestlé 
Treasury  
30.55 
29.30 
1.72 
N.A. N.A. 
Bnp  
Paribas 
94.18 71.68 +31.39 Belgian State 
Grand Duché de Lux. 
10.30 
1.00 
N.A. N.A. 
Lvmh 90.38 92.41  -2.20 Arnault Familiy Gr. 
Bulgari 
Treasury 
46.40 
2.50 
1.60 
N.A. N.A. 
Axa  64.33 43.02 +49.54 Mutuelles AXA 
AXA Assurances IARD 
Mutuelle 
14.35 
11.43 
7.43 
N.A. N.A. 
Edf 64.16 33.74 +90.16 French Government 84.44 
 
Morgan Stanley 
Sunrise Partners  
Bank of America Corp. 
N.A. 
Airbus 
Group 
59.49 32.41 +83.55 SPGEPA 
GZBV 
 SEPI 
12.00 
10.72 
4.13 
N.A. N.A. 
Gdf Suez 55.08 50.14 +9.85 French State 
Bruxelles Lambert 
CDC 
36.00 
5.20 
2.00 
N.A. N.A. 
Societe 
Generale 
43.13 26.40 +63.37 CDC 
Meiji Life Insur. 
Treasury  
2.52 
1.39 
1.13 
N.A. N.A. 
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(*) The Article L. 233-7 of the French Commercial Code obligate to inform the Company and the French Financial Markets 
Authority when the percentage of the share capital represents the minimum of 5%. 
Table-5. Italy – January 2014, Corporate stockholder structure (http://finanza-
mercati.ilsole24ore.com/, http://finance.yahoo.com, http://ycharts.com, www.borsaitaliana.it, 
companies’ websites)  
Company Capitalisation 
(Billion $) 
 Shares held by >2% retail 
shareholders (*) 
 Equity of the first 
institutional investors and 
mutual funds 
 
 Jan ‘14 Jan ‘13 %  %  % 
Eni 87.49 89.86 -2.64 Cassa Depositi e Prestiti  
Ministry of Economy  
BNP Paribas  
25.76 
4.34 
2.58 
Wellington Mngmt C. 
Vanguard Energy Fund 
Brandes Investment 
0.36 
0.31 
0.15 
Unicredit 46.22 30.90 +49.58 International Petroleum   
Ve,Vi,Bl,An Foundation 
6.50 
3.53 
Pamplona Capital Mngm  
. 
5.01 
 
Intesa 
Sanpaolo 
42.51 28.68 +48.22 Compagnia di San Paolo   
Cariplo  Foundation 
Pd, Ro Foundation 
9.71 
4.95 
4.51  
BlackRock 5.00 
Enel 41.09 38.74 +6.07 Ministry of Economy  31.30 N.A. N.A. 
Generali 36.34 26.46 +37.34 Mediobanca Spa   
Cassa depositi e prestiti 
Delfin Sarl   
13.27 
4.48 
3.01 
N.A. N.A. 
Luxottica 25.44 19.65 +29.47 Delfin Sarl   
Giorgio Armani  
61.35 
4.77 
Marathon Asset  
Scout Investments 
Neuberger Berman  
0.60 
0.43 
0.31 
Telecom 
Italia 
20.57 17.55 +17.21 Telco  
Findim Group   
Norges Bank  
22.39 
5.00 
2.02 
Brandes Investment  
Dimensional Fund  
DFA International Value  
0.59 
0.14 
0.10 
Snam 18.36 15.50 +18.45 Cassa Depositi e Prestiti 
Eni   
30.00 
20.23 
N.A. N.A. 
Atlantia 15.06 12.12 +24.26 Sintonia    
CRT Foundation   
Atlantia Spa   
45.56 
5.06 
2.01 
BlackRock 5.02 
CNH 
Industrial 
15.01 16.86 
(Sept. 
‘13) 
-10.97 Exor    
Fiat Spa    
Singapore Government  
30.01 
2.80 
2.33 
N.A. N.A. 
(*) The art. 117 of Consob Regulation n. 11971/99 obligates to communicate to Consob capital shareholding exceeding  the 
threshold of 2%. 
 
Both the insider and outsider systems possess advantages and disadvantages, and both have 
proved successful and failure, so it's difficult to argue relative superiority or inferiority (Solomon, 
2010). The weakness of outsider systems (emerged with the famous big corporations’ scandals) has 
highlighted the lack of transparency in communication to financial markets, which is the first 
prerequisite for the effectiveness of markets’ control. This situation has affected insider systems 
too, initially with regard to the most internationalized listed companies and then to the national 
ones.  
The convergence of corporate governance rules, codes of practice and principles, together with 
market-driven approach to capital markets and agreements among stock exchanges, support the 
thesis of some authors (Solomon, 2010) who suggest a 'global' compromise from the extreme forms 
of insider and outsider systems toward a similar and internationally accepted system of corporate 
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governance. At the same time, the adoption of a concept of global responsibility in favour of 
sustainable development for ample categories of stakeholders, as well as shareholders, can be 
considered an element which assimilate global companies independently by the countries.  
 
3. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS AND CAPITAL MARKETS 
ORIENTATION  
The size and the composition of management and supervisory boards can be interpreted as a 
tool for shareholders protection. The studies on corporate governance show the existence of two 
different models based on the relationship between shareholders, management and control bodies: 
the one-tier systems, where management and control activities are exercised by a single governance 
organ; the dual or two-tier systems with two distinct boards for the administrative and supervisory 
activities. 
In the horizontal two-tier model both the administrative organ and the supervisory one are 
appointed by shareholders' assembly, while in the vertical two-tier models the stockholders, 
sometimes with the participation of employees, appoint only the supervisory body, which in turn 
appoints the administrative board.  
 
Table- 6. USA – Board of directors (annual reports 2012) 
 Total 
members 
Executive 
members 
Non executive and  
non independent  
members 
Independent  
Directors 
  N° % N° % N° % 
Apple 8 1  12.50 - - 7 87.50 
Exxon Mobil 13 1  7.69 - - 12 92.31 
Google 10 3 30.00 1 10,00 6 60.00 
Microsoft 9 2 22.20 - - 7 77.80 
Berkshire Hatw 12 2 16.67 2 16,67 8 66.67 
General Electric 16 2 12.50 - - 14 87.50 
John & Johnson 13 2 15.38 - - 11 84.62 
Wal Mart Stores 16 6 37.50 - - 10 62.50 
Chevron Corp. 11 2 18.18 - - 9 81.82 
Wells and Fargo 14 1 7.14 - - 13 92.86 
 
Table-7. UK – Board of directors (annual reports 2012) 
 Total 
members 
Executive 
members 
Non executive and  
non independent  
members 
Independent 
Directors 
  N° % N° % N° % 
Royal Dutch Shl 13 2 15.38 - - 11 84.62 
Hsbc Holdings 18 4 22.22 - - 14 77.78 
BP 15 4 27.00 - - 11 73.00 
Glaxosmithkline 16 2 12.50 - - 14 87.50 
Vodafone Group 14 4 28.57 - - 10 71.43 
Brit Am Tobacc 11 3 27.27 - - 8 72.73 
Rio Tinto  12 3 25.00 - - 9 75.00 
Lloyds Bnk Grp 12 2 16.67 1 8.33 9 75.00 
Diageo  11 3 27.27 - - 8 72.73 
AstraZeneca 12 2 16.67 1 8.33 9 75.00 
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With reference to the one-tier model of corporate governance in outsider systems, the analysis 
in the US and UK companies (Tables 6 and 7) remarks the importance of forms of control on 
management activities by side of the market, mainly through the yearly mandate to govern and the 
significant number of independent directors, who exercise the control. These last guarantee the 
rights of a sprinkled ownership: the percentage of independent directors is on average about 80%. 
 Differently by one-tier model, in vertical two-ties systems, the shareholders can control the 
management’s activities not directly with the board  of directors’ appointment but by means of the 
election of the supervisory body. The analysis on the corporate governance systems of the German 
companies (on behalf of 'Rhenish' insider system) emphasises the role of employees (together with 
ownership) with their own delegation in the supervisory board (Table 8).  
 
Table-8. Germany - Corporate governance organs (annual reports 2012) 
 
The quality of independence of supervisory board's members is very relevant for the protection 
of minority shareholders, considering that this organ carries out control activities on management 
board. The number of independent members is variable, but in the majority of societies it is more 
than half of the entire board. The protection of the minority shareholders is strengthened also by 
means of the great length of mandate, typical of insider systems. 
France represents an insider system characterized by the choice between a one-tier model and a 
dual one. The one-tier system is clearly predominant (77% of the  listed companies on the SBF120 
index) and it allows to employees the representative right in the board (Institute Franais des 
Adminitrateurs, ''French Corporate Governance in listed Companies'', July 2012). All societies 
analyzed adopt one-tier system (Table 9).  
Comparing the one-tier model in insider (Table 9) and outsider systems (Tables 6 and 7), we 
can notice that the average of independent directors is lower in the first case and the number of non 
executive and non independent directors increases. This fact can be explained by the smaller 
control by the financial market and by the presence of the directors appointed by the employees, 
who are not independent but protect the interests of the employees and of the minority 
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shareholders. France represents a situation where the one-tier model has been adapted to a different 
orientation to the capital market. 
 
Table-9. France - Corporate governance organs (annual reports 2012) 
 Total 
members 
Executive 
members 
Non executive and  
non independent  
members 
Independent  
Directors 
Length of 
mandate 
(years) (*) 
  N° % N° % N° %  
Sanofi  16 1 6.25 5 31.25 10 62.50 3 
Total 15 1 6.67 3 20.00 11 73.33 3 
L’ Oreal 14 1 7.14 6 42.86 7 50.00 3 
Bnp Paribas 14 1 7.14 3 21.43 10 71.43 3 
Lvmh 15 1 6.67 6 40.00 8 53.33 3 
Axa  15 3 20.00 1 6.67 11 73.33 3 
Edf 18 1 5.56 12 66.67 5 27.77 5  
Airbus 
Group 
12 1 8.33 1 8.33 10 83.34 3 
Gdf Suez 17 1 5.88 7 41.18 9 52.94 4 
Soc.Gen. 15 1 6.67 4 26.67 10 66.66 3 
(*) The length of mandate is three years for French Law. In the Public Sector it can be different (Law on the 
Democratisation of the Public Sector) 
 
In Italy the reform of corporate law in 2003 combines an horizontal two-tier model (called 
‘traditional’) with vertical two-tier and one-tier ones. In the traditional model the shareholders’ 
meeting appoints both the board of directors and the board of auditors.  
The dominant culture, habits and the characteristics of Italian capital market tend to determine 
a net preponderance of traditional model (97%), while changes in corporate governance systems 
appear to be linked with extraordinary event (e.g. M&A) (Consob, 2013). In the analysed 
companies only one (Intesa S.Paolo) has a vertical two-tier model of corporate governance (that in 
Italy doesn’t consider the employees’ representation in the general assembly). 
 
Table-10. Italy - Corporate governance organs (corporate governance reports 2012) 
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* Substitute members 
 
The model characterizing Italian corporate governance (‘Latin’ insider system, where majority 
stockholders are very important) marks that capital market-driven approach is firstly connected 
with decisions of shareholders’ meeting as unique principal of management and control power to 
company’s boards. The role of stable ownership is reflected in the stability and duration of 
corporate governance boards’ mandates, but it’s adequately balanced by tools for the protection of 
minority stockholders (e.g. appointment of boards’ members using ‘list vote’ technique and high 
number of non executive directors) (Table10). 
In conclusion we can affirm that corporate governance systems are connected to degree of 
capital market orientation and the need to identify mechanism of shareholders’ protection, with 
particular regard to minority shareholders. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Globalisation, the interventions of international regulatory organisms and the increasing 
importance of sustainability have induced to a trend towards the harmonisation of corporate 
governance on a global level. However this situation, the variances existing in the composition of 
corporate shareholder structure and in the capitalisation value reveal differences about stock 
markets orientation.  
In outsider systems the emerging concepts of sustainable development are very important, 
because the heavy reliance on stocks markets may encourage managers to focus excessively on 
projects with short term payoffs, even when this is to the detriment of long term corporate 
performance. On the other hand, the long permanency as members of the board is often a shape of 
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consent on corporate governance, related to the ability to create long term value but also to the 
ability to equitably distribute the value created.  
Capital markets in insider systems tend to be much less well developed than those found in 
outsider systems, there is a much greater emphasis on banks as providers of external finance and 
debt/equity ratios are typically higher. So, in the insider systems the roles of internal control body 
and the composition of administrative organ are the prerequisites for the stakeholders protection; 
the stock market-driven approach is oriented toward the retention of capitalisation value at first. 
Concentrated ownership increases the incentives for monitoring, with presumably positive benefits 
for firm performance, but it also encourages more long-term relationships and commitment 
amongst stakeholders. In this situation, often the long permanency as members of the structure of 
corporate governance is related to blockholders controlling shareholders (family, holding, block 
alliance, or financial institution and other corporations), who exercise control over management.  
The effectiveness of different corporate governance systems is influenced by the integration of 
responsibilities and by the increased global competition in product and capital markets.  
The growing importance, given to the affirmation of governance oriented to global 
responsibility and stakeholder relation management, involves a greater attention to the principles 
and values that dominate the internal and external relations. In this sense, it has recently witnessed 
a proliferation of international recommendations and numerous national regulatory interventions, 
which have promoted an increasing focus – especially by bigger and listed companies– on the 
quality of the governance.   
In this regard, establishing effective relationships with shareholders is of primary importance 
and, for listed companies, must take into account the significant variables in the stock market where 
they are listed, the other operators that they compete with to acquire capital, investors’ expectations 
and the existence of possible facilitators and/or influencers of behaviour. 
In the last years, corporate sustainability has become an important selection criterion for 
investors. It is evident, in fact, that a governance approach that aims at increasing the shareholders 
abilities of creating values over time serve as tools to help investors make decisions both in insider 
and in outsider systems. 
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